The far-reaching political, commercial, fiscal, and military reforms of Charles III in Spain's American empire are a familiar subject. What is not well known is the major role played in the initiation of these reforms by Charles' minister of finance and war, Leopoldo di Grigorio, the Marqués de Esquilache. In the traditional literature, José Gálvez, as visitor-general of New Spain (1765-1771), and as minister of the Indies (1776-1787), appears as the primary agent of the Bourbon monarchy in shaping colonial policy. While the importance of Gálvez is indisputable, especially during his tenure in the Ministry of the Indies, it was not he but Esquilache who was the primary architect of the colonial reorganization. With the strong support of the queen mother, Isabel Farnese, Esquilache dominated the formation of American policy in the years of Charles' reign immediately following Spain's defeat in the Seven Years' War. During that period, ambitious experiments were conducted in Cuba through the able hands of the Conde de Riela and Alejandro O'Reilly, but with the support and guidance of Esquilache at court. Esquilache's achievements in shaping a workable reform program for Cuba left a foundation for Gálvez to build upon a decade later when the task befell him to guide the empire through the turbulent era of the American Revolution.
Esquilache's reforms must be understood within the context of recent military defeat and an urgent need to rebuild the armed forces in America. Charles III, who had succeeded his half brother Ferdinand VI to the throne in 1759, entered the Seven Years' War in 1762. Charles recklessly elected to commit Spain to the side of France at a time when the latter was fast losing the conflict. The basis for this cooperation was the Third Family Compact, an alliance signed in August 1761. Spain's war effort was systematically defeated on battlefields ranging from Portugal to Manila. The most humiliating defeat came at Havana, which surrendered to a vastly superior British force in August 1762. Spain's ordeal ended with the Treaty of Paris, February 10, 1763. Under its provision, she succeeded in retrieving Havana but only by sacrificing Florida.
Spain failed at Havana primarily because of manpower deficiencies. In the face of an invasion force of more than 14,000, Havana's defenders could marshal only some 2,384 veteran troops and an untrained militia that proved nearly worthless. Spain's veterans fought valiantly, but the superior British force eventually pounded them into submission during a seige of two months 1 . Understandably, Charles' first peacetime priority was the restoration of Spanish power in America.
Charles' father, Philip V (1700-1746), had made a promising start toward modernizing Cuba's defenses but this process had stagnated during the reign of Ferdinand VI (1746-1759). Philip had combined a number of separate companies into a fixed infantry battalion of seven 100-man companies in 1719 with a much upgraded officer corps. Single companies of artillery and cavalry continued to complement the infantry 2 . The hope was that this force, although small, could function successfully behind the extensive complex of fortifications protecting Havana and that during periods of crisis additional battalions from Spain could be deployed in the colony. Moreover, Philip gradually expanded this small garrison by adding five separate infantry companies and by replacing the cavalry company with three companies of dragoons 3 . Similar arrangements existed in other Caribbean and gulf strong-holds including, for example, Cartagena, which received its fixed battalion in 1736, Santo Domingo 1738, New Spain 1740, and Panama 1741 4 . During a period in which Spain necessarily placed primary emphasis upon rebuilding the armada and when the treasury faced financial exigency in the extreme, it is unlikely that substantially more could have been done for the colonial land defenses.
Much to the glory of Spain and the personal satisfaction of Philip V, the modernized defense system had worked during the War of Jenkins' Ear. Cartagena's fixed battalion, reinforced by two Spanish battalions and detachments from the navy, turned back a massive British invasion in 1741. A lesser attack on Santiago de Cuba also failed. There was, nevertheless, reason for concern in these events. Victory at Cartagena was snatched only narrowly from the jaws of defeat, owing in significant measure to British leadership failures. Otherwise, the British, whose colonial establishment in America was growing by leaps and bounds, outnumbered the defenders six to one, demonstrating a fearsome capacity to strike at any point in the Caribbean with thousands of troops. This capacity augured ill for the future, but in the euphoria of self-congratulai ion that followed the victory, such disquieting lessons were ignored in Spain 5 .
Given British naval supremacy and the ability to select the point of attack, Spain's only real hope to match enemy manpower was to draw upon the native population. A method for incorporating civilians effectively into the defense system had been developed in Spain with the establishment of the provincial or "disciplined" militia system in 1734. This program provided units with a standard Iish Succession, it proved an efficient method of developing a large reserve of trained manpower, and Spain retained the disciplined militia thereafter 6 . Spain did not attempt, however, to establish a disciplined militia in America at the same time nor, more importantly, following the War of Jenkins' Ear. Basking in the glory of victory, wary of arming the colonials too well, and, perhaps, also mindful that the new militia system was costly, the crown seems not to have considered the possibility seriously. Moreover, the throne had passed to Ferdinand VI in 1746. Ferdinand moved away from the anti-British orientation .of his father, opting instead for neutrality in the increasingly hostile rivalry between Great Britain and France. Indeed, he placed the Ministry of State in the hands of anglophile José de Carvajal y Lancaster and upon Carvajal's death in 1754, Ricardo Wall, who was also pro-British. In 1759, Wall added the portfolio for War to his duties, and it was common knowledge, moreover, that the minister of the Indies, Julián de Arriaga, was much under his influence. The new attitude at court translated into a listless, unimaginative approach to the question of American defense. Consequently, in spite of some minor upward manpower adjustments in Cuba, no major innovations to advance its defenses transpired 7 . The folly of the Fernandista policies became all too evident when the British marched into Havanna in 1762.
II
The war having ended quickly but in defeat, Charles was put in the position of having to give thought to the general posture of Spain and its empire. With England having struck so successfully at Cuba, New Spain's strategic rim, Charles prepared to set the machinery in motion for an ambitious military and economic program for the island, and, by implication, for the rest of the empire. The conventional interpretation of this process has held that France exercised a dominant influence on Charles' reforms. Though France had a prominent impact on Spanish strategy during this period, her influence was not determinative. The primary impetus for the colonial reforms came from within the Spanish court itself, from a combination of new and older Leadership, with the French role being largely supportive. Within this revitalized inner circle of royal advisors, the Marqués de Esquilache had begun to play a dominant role.
In the aftermath of the war, the Family Compact stood as the most workable exterior instrument with which to bolster the overseas reconstruction program 8 . This alliance had been jointly the work of Louis XV and his outreaching first minister, the Duke of ChoiseuT, and of Charles III and his ambassador to France, the Marqués de Grimaldi. On France's side, Louis, out of the desire to ensure that France would have a maritime ally in the final stages of the struggle against England, sought the pact, if anything, even more than his minister, who was trying separately to dicker with England to produce an end to the war. On Spain's, the exact reasons why Charles was willing to plunge to the aid of France's sinking ship are not fully comprehensible even today, but Charles' sentimental attachment to the royal relationship, above all his desire to avoid in the future ever having to face England overseas alone, and his resentment of that nation going back to his Naples days seem the most plausible 9 . At any rate, in the years immediately following the defeat, the leaders in both countries were firmly determined to carry out a military and colonial reorganization that would enable them before very many years to seek another confrontation with England, confident that they would reverse the outcome of the Seven Years' War. In Choiseul's case, so eager he was in the middling-sixties to be the friendly accessory of an effective Spanish renovation that his communications with the Count d'Ossun, his ambassador at Charles Ill's court, were replete with remarks on this subject 10 . Thus, the Spanish king understood that, as he launched his new program, he enjoyed strong support on his flank. As the years passed, Charles and his ministers were to learn that Choiseul talked a much stronger game than he was able to perform, but, at least at the initiation of the Cuban military reform program, they had every reason to believe that France stood solidly with them -even propelled them on.
Given this set of circumstances, Charles, who did not like to see new faces by his side very often, needed a certain recasting of personalities in his cabinet. The need centered around Ricardo Wall, the incumbent as foreign and war policy executor. When Spain had entered the war, Wall went along, despite his neutralistic attitude toward England under Ferdinand VI, a neutrality that, if anything, had learned toward mild cultivation of the old enemy 11 . Logically, Wall should have objected strenuously and resigned when Charles decided to commit himself to France against England or, if he felt that England's instrusiveness at last required Spain's entry, he should have produced a stronger and better coordinated war effort. As it turned out, the 1762 fighting proved that he was anything but a Pitt as a war leader. In the post-war environment of reorganization in anticipation of future confrontation, Wall's record and achievements were unsuited to the nature of the task at hand.
The customary explanation of Wall's passing is that Charles, out of consideration for his age and health, allowed him to retire 12 . Another truism about the early years of Charles is that the redoubtable queen mother, Isabel Farnese, did not regain the great influence that she had once wielded as Philip V's consort 13 . These observations need partial correction. The evidence distinctly suggests that Wall received a push when he left office and that Isabel Farnese 's part in this event was sufficiently important to be able to say that she made at least a partial comeback. When the king became a widower in 1760, the way opened for her to exercise a renewed influence. While she was long since Philip's widow, she was always Charles' mother. The monarch did not forget his maternal parent's efforts years before on his behalf. Charles owed enough to Wall so that he would not have been able to dump him crudely, but because the minister was a holdover from Ferdinand's time, the monarch did not owe him unswerving allegiance. Years before, he had served Charles, too, in Italy. Furthermore, Charles, once in power in Spain, had doubled Wall's responsibility by giving him the War portfolio to go along with State 14 . Circumstances called for letting him out gently.
Meantime, the dowager-queen far from shared her son's respect for his elderly minister. For a long time she had harbored a dim view of his abilities. Now, Spanish policy failures in the abbreviated war seemed to bear out her opinion. Charles listened attentively to his mother's views and, in no small part due to her urging, let Wall go in August, 1763. Charles maintained the proper amenities by the announcement that the minister's failing health necessitated his resignation 15 . On a common sense basis, this explanation appeared believable, for Wall was verging on old age at the time.
A question of equal or greater moment was the choice of Wall's successor. Charles chose to split Wall's dual functions and assigned the portfolio for State to the Marqués de Grimaldi, who returned from his post as ambassador to France. By comparison with his predecessor, Grimaldi was a man in his early forties. It was not the queen mother, but the Marques de Esquilache who exercised the dominant influence on the king in this choice, although she had a confirming role 16 . To Charles, her views on the subject were sufficiently important for him to have a private audience with her about the appointment. Just why she preferred Grimaldi does not emerge, but it may be conjectured, in light of her Parmese origins and her lifelong attachment to matters Italian, that she liked the idea of Italian counsellors around her son. This was no insignificant issue, for, during two-thirds of the century, the number of non-Spanish advisors of the king was a sore point among the Spanish 17 . At this very moment, the court nationalists were hoping that the foreign ministry would go to Augustin de Llanos, first secretary under Wall, and a man who had handled his duties well enough 18 . Thanks to Esquilache and the queen-mother, however, this hope was not to be.
As has been observed, Esquilache by 1763 was coming to have an increasingly dominant role in the determination of colonial policy. His influence was growing steadily in general, as his part in Grimaldi's appointment demonstrates. A further indication is that he received the War portion of Wall's twin offices. A Sicilian, Esquilache had accompanied Charles to Spain from Italy. In the Two Sicilies, Esquilache had begun his association with the monarch by being responsible for provisioning the army in the Austrian Succession War, then had been advanced to minister of finance, and finally had been given authority to join War, Navy, and Commerce with his other office to create a consolidated ministry. This made him only a jot inferior to Tanucci, Charles' famous enlightened counsellor. When king and minister moved to Spain, Esquilache again received the Ministry of Finance and an increasingly dominant role in colonial policy soon followed. Apparently Esquilache's talents were difficult to assess. One of England's ambassadors sized him up as mediocre, and Tanucci with whom he did not get along, regarded him as trouble-prone. On the other hand, d'Ossun saw him as capable, and, most importantly, Charles, for as long as it was feasible, displayed great confidence in him 19 . As for Grimaldi, he was a Genoese who had entered the Spanish diplomatic service. After gaining experience in middle level appointments, he served as minister to the Netherlands before moving on to the important French ambassadorship 20 . In light of his contacts with Choiseul, personal as well as diplomatic, he became a logical candidate to become foreign minister. With Esquilache and the dowager-queen working on his behalf, the king chose in his favor.
Another figure whose position was vulnerable, but who unlike Wall managed to survive -perhaps because he was a Spaniardwas the previously mentioned Julián de Arriaga, the minister of the navy and the Indies. Although actually something of a mediocrity, Arriaga's virtues included honesty and loyalty, enabling Charles, apparently by a narrow margin to retain him. Both in Italy and in Spain, Charles exhibited an extraordinary loyalty to his ministers, preferring to tolerate, indeed work around, weakness and failure rather than embarrass or humiliate a devoted servant. Enfeebled and isolated from court life and politics, Arriaga found himself increasingly bypassed in shaping colonial policy, with Esquilache asserting real control 21 . In one instance, for example, when informed that Charles had appointed three subordinates for his ministry without consulting him, the venerable Arriaga discreetly and indirectly inquired about the King's behavior. Charles responded that given his blunders leading up to and during the Seven Years' War Arriaga should consider himself fortunate to still hold his portfolio 22 . Under these conditions, Arriaga, although formally controlling the Ministry of the Indies, had very little power.
As Charles' new program began to acquire substance, France, through Choiseul, sought to exercise a significant influence over it. Aspiring to be a Richelieu-like figure, Choiseul in the long run proved to be a Richelieu-mançu^. One of his points of resemblance to the great cardinal was his ambition to extend his direct influence as far as possible. With Spain in the position of being his close associate, this ambition was especially visible in his relations with her. As the result, some historians have maintained that the enjoyed a major, perhaps a dominant, influence on Spanish policy 23 . Several portents have suggested this conclusion, but, looked at from the Spanish perspective, it says too much. One justification for this view is that the new policy of naval building and colonial rearmament was exactly what Choiseul, in his directions to Ambassador d'Ossun, urged Spain to undertake 24 . Also, when Grimaldi, Choiseul's friend while he was in Paris, became foreign minister, it appeared as if the French leader gained the special advantage of having a close personal acquaintance, noteworthy for his pro-French viewpoint, placed in a key position in the Spanish government 25 . Then too, at Charles' court d'Ossun emerged as the king's favorite foreign representative 26 .
Though these affinities are not to be dismissed, too much should not be made of them. Charles was determined to follow a course that would be advantageous to Spain 27 . It is obvious that the appointment of Grimaldi as foreign minister pleased France, but the selection was Charles' and Esquilache's doing, not the result of Choiseul's influence. Indeed, at the time of Wall's resignation, Choiseul expressed regret at his leaving. It was only after the resignation that Choiseul learned from d'Ossun that he had not looked warmly upon France 28 . The French diplomatic influence, then, while a factor in the Ibero-Gaulic tie, probably did not reach decisive proportions.
A direction in which a small but more readily definable amount of French influence existed lay in fortification strategy. In the area of military techniques, France continued to enjoy the reputation of being in the forefront, with the Prussia of Frederick gaining rapidly in this respect. Charles requested that Louis XV allow him to borrow the service of Joseph-Florent, Marquis de Vallières, to conduct an overview of Spanish defenses. This officer had built up an enviable record as an artillery and ordinance expert in the European conflicts from the Polish Succession through the Seven Years' War 29 . Between 1762 and 1764, •Vallières carried out Charles' assignment. When, in Cuba, the Spanish developed a refortification program, the better to protect Havana, the synopsis of that program upon reaching the Spanish court, was referred to Vallières for his assessment. For his services, the French officer received from Charles the title of honorary marqués and a portrait of the king. Had he been willing to settle in Spain, his rewards would have been greater 30 . It is not unlikely that he had a certain degree of influence on the Spanish military revival, especially on its fortifications emphasis.
As a source on Spanish policy, d'Ossun's dispatches have more than routine worth. Because he enjoyed the insider's position in the maneuvering among the foreign dignitaries at Charles' court, he was able to provide his superior with exceptionally detailed and accurate data on the new Spanish policy at the moment it began to take shape. Choiseul's comments on d'Ossun's reports similarly have value because they provide an insight into the reaction of the leading policy-maker in France to Spanish stirrings.
From d'Ossun's reports one can deduce, for example, that when Charles retained Arriaga while removing Wall, he intended him to act largely as a figurehead. In the last months of Wall's administration. Arriaga, who had been dominated by that minister, had been unresponsive to a Choiseul proposal that Spain launch a comprehensive overseas reorganization at once 31 . Had this attitude prevailed, renovation would not have gone very far. This situation added importance to Grimaldi's installation. Thereafter, he and Esquilache, like Wall before them, were able to dominate Arriaga so that he moved in the direction that the king desired to go.
In order to concentrate on the reorganization of colonial policy, Charles ordered Esquilache, Grimaldi, and Arriaga to meet once weekly in secret sessions 32 . Though the minutes of the gatherings, if they were kept, apparently have not survived, d'Ossun's references to them provide important insights into their tenor. It is evident, for instance, that Esquilache and Grimaldi initiated policies, and that Arriaga followed their lead. It is obvious, too, that Grimaldi pushed the French point of view, even to the extent on one occasion of reading to the others a passage from one of Choiseul's letters bearing on the French official's conception of the partner's needs 33 . This is an example of how it is possible to perceive Choiseul's influence in Spanish affairs in this period as dominant. It must be repeated, however, that it was not the French who had maneuvered Grimaldi's advancement and that it was Esquilache, who viewed France quite cooly, who was the most influential official. Decisions made south of the Pyrenees determined the shape that colonial reforms would eventually take.
Ill
With the Marqués de Esquilache dominating the reorganized government, the reform program that Charles advanced for Cuba, and by implication the rest of the empire, reached far in its intentions. At the core of this program was the establishment of a provincial or "disciplined" militia, a plan first presented to Charles by the Conde de Riela in January 1763 even before the peace was signed 34 . By subjecting strategically located components of the native population to systematic training under the supervision of veteran cadres and by equipping them properly, this system promised to produce the kind of reserve forcc that had been lacking in 1762. Riela was the cousin of the Conde de Aranda, one of the most influential people at Court, who would soon become president of the Council of Castile. Charles also had strong personal reasons to have confidence in the idea to upgrade the milita. The Conde de Montemar, one of the original authors of the provincial militia plan for Spain, upon which Riela now based his scheme, was the same officer who, with Charles at his side, had led a combined Italian and Spanish army into Naples in 1734, defeating the Austrians and thereby clearing the way for Charles' reign as king of the Two Sicilies 35 . Montemar was now dead, but his militia system promised to fortify and preserve Charles' crown in America. Charles named the Conde de Riela governor and captain general of Cuba and commisioned him to repossess Havana from the British in accord with the provisions of the Peace of Paris. Accompanying Riela were some 600 veteran officers and enlisted men to train the new militia, troops for the veteran garrison, equipment for the reorganized army, and Field Marshal Alejandro O'Reilly. O'Reilly, who had a brilliant service record and was a close personal friend of Riela, was the governor's choice actually to effect the military reorgnaization, freeing him for broader political duties.
After Riela and his expedition officially took possession of Havana in July, O'Reilly quickly reestablished the fixed infantry, cavalry, and artillery units. Under Ricla's plan at least one Spanish regiment would reinforce these units at all times, thus bringing the authorized strength of the garrison to 3,208 compared to 2,112 before the war 36 . By December, O'Reilly had also raised a disciplined militia in Havana consisting of a white infantry regiment of two battalions, a white cavalry regiment, and two colored infantry battalions. In early 1764, he extended his work to the rest of the island, raising another four infantry battalions and a regiment of dragoons. The new militia totalled 7,500 volunteers 37 .
The extent of Esquilache's influence, if any, on the original decision to establish a disciplined militia in Cuba and on the naming of Riela as captain general of Cuba is unclear, but it is evident that after the fall of Wall the Italian quickly asserted his power in the American sphere. Establishing a personal line of communication with Riela and O'Reilly which operated separately from that of the minister of the Indies, Esquilache involved himself in all major areas of policy development, ranging from war to administration and finance. Some, although not all, major royal orders for Cuba actually went out under his signature. The officials in Cuba dutifully maintained dual lines of correspondence to Arriaga and Esquilache but they understood perfectly well where the real power lay and they cultivated the Italian accordingly 38 . To Riela, for example, Esquilache was "mi dueño", for O'Reilley "mi favorecedor", and for Pasqual de Cisneros, the lieutenant governor of Havana, he was "mi único protector"* 9 .
In a little more than two years, Esquilache, working in coordination with Riela and O'Reilly, developed a comprehensive reform program for Cuba. On December 6, 1763, O'Reilly through Riela sent to Spain a full report on the establishment of the disciplined militia of Havana, including troop tables and a preliminary statement of costs and procedures 40 . This report reached the Junta de Ministros in March where it received an enthusiastic reception 41 . After he had extended his work to the rest of the island, O'Reilly built upon his December 6 report to fashion a comprehensive regulation for the militia of Cuba. O'Reilly based this policy upon the Spanish regulation of 1734, but made numerous adjustments for American realities. In October 1764, Esquilache ordered the regulation printed, a task completed during the following year 42 . Expanded and republished in 1769, this regulation was dispatched to most other jurisdictions of America to serve as the basis for militia government 43 .
While O'Reilly reorganized the army, Riela sought the means to finance it. Charles and Esquilache had understood from the start that raising a fully equipped disciplined militia under the supervision of veteran personnel, coupled with an expansion of the regular army, would be costly and would therefore entail revenue reform and probably political and commercial policy adjustments. Moreover, the cost of rebuilding and expanding the vast fortification complex would be enormous. Mexican monies could fund the latter, but Charles hoped that Cuba would eventually finance the army. Therefore, when drafting Ricla's instructions, Esquilache vested him with broad powers to seek the means to sustain a competitive military establishment 44 . This difficult undertaking and the action to reorganize the army marked the beginning of Charles Ill's reforms in America.
Working with José Antonio Gelabert, an official from the Tribunal de Cuentas, Riela explored a wide range of possible revenue sources. This work produced a report in December 1763 to Esquilache, and through him to the Junta de Ministros, which proposed fourteen possible measures 45 . Fearful of provoking resistance, the Junta approached the subject of taxation with restraint, acting in only three areas. It doubled the alcabala from two to four percent, placed a three percent tax on incomes from certain types of property, including land, and established a tax of two pesos per barrel of aguardiente and a silver real per barrel of sambumbia. An order of April 25, 1764, from the desk of Esquilache, conveyed this action to Cuba 46 . Meanwhile, Riela and O'Reilly carefully explained to the Cuban patriciate the need for higher taxes, but intimated that appropriate rewards would accompany cooperation. These rewards would include important commercial concessions to help generate the new revenues and, ga to the Governor of Caracas, San Ildefonso, September 20,1773, in Santiago-Gerardo S u á r e ζ (ed.), Las fuerzas armadas venezolanas en la colonia (Caracas, 1979), pp. 160-161. 44 for the elite, offices in the militia which those monies would finance. While militia offices represented immediate compensation, commercial reforms required deliberate planning, and, in fact, awaited a report from O'Reilly who, in conjunction with raising the disciplined militia, was conducting a "visit" of the island to investigate the possibilities for political, economic, and commercial reforms 47 . Meanwhile, Esquilache worked to establish a more effective means to collect and disburse revenues. His answer to this need was the intendancy system which had been established in Spain under Philip V. As structured for Cuba, the intendant's responsibilities would include stringent emphasis upon increasing royal income, eliminating fraud and contraband, and managing military expenditures. The intendant was a high-powered official and the establishment of this office in Cuba marked Charles' first experiment with provincial reform in America 48 . 
